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LIST OF ALL PARTIES

The caption on Plaintiffs' Brief is not correct because it lists Jeanette R. Lynton
as a Defendant and does not list all the Defendants named by Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs'

Amended Complaint1 included additional parties.
As a result of the trial court's ruling by Order dated 9/8/942, that DOT
Adventures, Inc., was a valid corporation. The District Court directed that Jeanette
R. Lynton be dismissed from the case and that her name be deleted from the caption.
Consequently, the caption of the case should read as follows:
Walter Semidey, Angel Santiago, Humberto Bardales, and Rosa
Mazariegos,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
DOT Adventures, Inc., Miguelangel Esquivel, Maria "Cookie" Reyes,
Humberto Hernandez,
Defendants.

Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint filed June 13,1994, R107-99
Exhibit 2, Order filed September 9,1994, R 304-303
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
§78-2-2(3)(j). Under §78-2a-3(2)(k), the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to
transfer from the Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the District Court commit

reversible error when

it granted

Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, dismissing the action against Jeanette
R. Lynton, an individual?
2.

Did the District Court commit

reversible error when

it granted

Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment dismissing the action against all the
Defendants?
In reviewing any order granting summary judgment, the Court of Appeals is
to view facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the party opposing the
judgment, giving no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions, 3 and the Court
of Appeals is free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions. 4
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
§16-10A-1502(6):
The failure of a foreign corporation to have authority to transact
business in this state does not impair the validity of its corporate acts,
nor does the failure prevent the corporation from defending any
proceeding in this state. [Emphasis added]

Pratt By and Through Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irr. Co., 813 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1991).
G.G.A., Inc., v. Levenhs, 773 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1989).

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This entire action arises out of a single incident which occurred on or about
December 16,1992, at the work place of Plaintiffs and the corporate Defendant DOT
Adventures, Inc. (hereinafter "DOT").

On or about that date, an employee had

reported that $20.00 was missing from her purse. Miguelangel Esquivel (hereinafter
"Esquivel"), DOT's plant manager, asked the employees of DOT, possibly 50 in
number, including the four Plaintiffs, to submit to an individual check or search of
their persons. Following the checking or searching, the employees went back to
work. At the time, none of the employees objected to being checked or searched.
No objection or complaint was made by anyone until Plaintiffs filed this action.
Some nine months later, after all Plaintiff had obtained other, higher paying,
jobs with other companies, Plaintiffs filed this action, claiming that during the time
of their employment, specifically on or about December 16th, 1992, Plaintiffs had a
cause of action which arose from the checking or searching process.
Plaintiffs7 Amended Complaint alleged that Plaintiffs had causes of action
against all Defendants for: wrongful detention; assault; battery; false i m p r i s o n m e n t ;
intentional and reckless infliction of emotional distress; intrusion into physical
privacy; intrusion into personal belongings; and intrusion into personal affairs.
As to Jeanette R. Lynton (hereinafter "Lynton"), Plaintiffs alleged that Lynton
was personally liable because she was a stockholder, officer and director or DOT.
Lynton was not present during the checking or searching and had no knowledge of
it until some time later.

2

Plaintiffs7 action against Lynton rested upon a theory that since DOT, a
Nevada Corporation had not obtained a Certificate Of Authorization from the Utah
Division of Corporations to do business in Utah until January 5, 1993, the N e v a d a
corporation doing business in Utah had somehow lost its corporate status, leaving
Lynton as a sole proprietor, personally liability for all debts and actions against the
company or any of its agents.
Plaintiffs sought to have the trial court rule, as a matter of law, that a foreign
corporation loses its corporate status when it begins doing business in Utah w i t h o u t
first

obtaining

a Certificate

Of Authorization

from

the

Utah

Division

of

Corporations and that Lynton therefore became personally liable, as a matter of law.
Rejecting Plaintiffs7 argument, on September 8, 1994, the District Court
granted Partial Summary Judgment 5 , dismissing Jeanette R. Lynton from the case.
Completing discovery, Defendants moved for Summary Judgment, supported
by Memorandum.

At the hearing held on July 14, 1995, the trial court tried to

explain to Plaintiffs7 counsel the nature of the elements required to establish the
alleged causes of action, stating that the court, not observing any question of
material fact, and, viewing the allegations in light most favorable to the Plaintiffs,
could not see how the matter could go forward.

The trial court made

the

observation that, even if Plaintiffs7 were able to establish facts sufficient to sustain all
of their allegations, there would still be a questions of damages. "Where are your
damages? 77 For a detailed account from the record, please reffer to "Addendum A77,

Exhibit 2, Order filed September 9,1994, R 304-303

3

Even then, declining to dismiss the case at that point, the trial court granted
Plaintiffs an additional thirty (30) days to show that they could produce evidence to
meet the elements of their multiple allegations, including any admissible evidence
supporting their claim of having sufferred severe emotional injury damages.
Plaintiffs filed additional documents to which the Defendants responded as a
matter of law.

Without requiring further hearing, the District Court granted

Summary Judgment 6 dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint against all the remaining
Defendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Parties.
1.

The Defendant, DOT Adventures, Inc., (hereinafter

"DOT"), is a

Nevada corporation qualified to do business in Utah.7
2.

On January 5, 1993, DOT Adventures, a Nevada corporation, obtained

formal authority from the Utah Division of Corporations to transact business in the
state of Utah under the name of "DOT Adventures, Inc."8
3.

The Defendants, Miguelangel Esquivel (hereinafter "Esquivel"), Marie

Reyes (hereinafter "Reyes") and Humberto Hernandez (hereinafter "Hernandez"),
were employed by DOT, working at the manufacturing plant (hereinafter "Plant") in
Orem, Utah.
4.

Esquivel, was the Plant Manager.9 His duties required him to oversee

and efficiently manage the ongoing daily manufacture and shipment of DOT
products.
6

Exhibit 3, Order filed July 14,1995, R 703-701
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5.

Reyes, and Hernandez were supervisors, acting under the authority

and direction of Esquivel.10
6.

The

Plaintiffs,

Walter

Semidey

(hereinafter

"Semidey"),

Angel

Santiago (hereinafter "Santiago"), Humberto Bardales (hereinafter "Bardales"), and
Mazariegos (hereinafter "Mazariegos"), were employed by DOT, working at the
Plant.

The Plaintiff's salary checks were all drawn under the name of DOT

Adventures, Inc.11
7.

DOT's business is the design, manufacture and marketing of a large

variety of small

rubber stamps used by purchasers

to decorate

personal

communications.

The manufacture and shipment of such rubber stamps is

accomplished at the Plant.
The incident.
8.

For cause of action, the Plaintiffs' have alleged that on December 16 or

17 of the year 1992 (hereinafter "December 16, 1992"), at the Defendant's Plant in
Orem, the following events occurred:
a.

At approximately 10:00 a.m., Esquivel gave instructions

that work at the Plant was to stop and that all employees were to gather
to the lunch area.12

Exhibit 4, Certified Copy of the Certificate of Authority and Certificate of Corporate Status, R 231-229
Exhibit 4, Certified Copy of the Certificate of Authority and Certificate of Corporate Status, R 231-229
Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint filed June 13,1994, R107-99, at R 106, para. 6
Exhibit 1 Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint filed June 13,1994, R 107-99, at R106, para 8,
and R 105, para 10
Exhibit 5, Affidavit of Bryant Lancaster, CPA, filed May 31,1994, R 85-79, at R 82-79
Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint filed June 13,1994, R107-99, at R105, para 16
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b.

At the lunch area, Esquivel told everyone present that he

had received information that twenty dollars ($20.00) had been stolen
from a purse of one of the Plant workers.13
c.

At the lunch area,14 Esquivel gave directions to the

supervisors that all employees would be checked or searched.15
d.

Esquivel stated that if anyone objected, he or she was to

indicate that objection or raise their hand. No person objected.

No

person raised their hand.16
e.

Esquivel instructed all male employees to individually,

one at a time, go to the men's room with Hernandez.

The female

employees were to go to the women's room with Reyes (a female
supervisor). 17
f.

The male Plaintiffs report that in the rest room they were

asked to show their pockets, wallets and the inside of their shoes.18
g.

While she admits that none of her clothing was removed,

the Plaintiff female employee, Mazariegos, alleges that she was also
asked to loosen her bra and that Reyes (the female supervisor) touched
her by running her fingers along and inside the lower line of her bra.19
Mazariegos did not say at that time that she objected to the procedure
or the alleged touching.

Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint filed June 13,1994, R 107-99, at R 105, para 17
Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, pg. 15 lines 16-18
Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, pg. 17 lines 2Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, pg. 17, lines 14-17
Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, pg. 18, lines 6-24
Exhibit 20, Deposition of Walter Semidey, dated April 21,1994, pg. 42, lines 12-13
Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, page 23, lines 7-19
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h.

No other person has described any touching similar to

that described by Mazariegos, and none is alleged.
i.

Semidey testified that he believed that if the incident had

been ordered by the police, it would have been lawful.20
j.

After the checking was completed, Esquivel told everyone

to go back to work. Everyone went back to work. 21
k.
9.

No stolen money was found.

Although the Plaintiff Mazariegos claims that the Plaintiffs were told

that no one was to leave, 22 no door was locked or barred. 23
10.

The Plaintiff Bardales, testified in his deposition that no one stated that

he would be prohibited from leaving. 24
11.
restrained.

None of the Plaintiffs made any attempt to leave. 25 None
No guard was posted.

were

No physical show of force or restraint was

demonstrated. 2 6
12.

There is no evidence or testimony that there was any showing of

restraint or an indication that it would be used to prevent anyone from leaving.
13.

There is no evidence or testimony that there was any force used. There

is no evidence or testimony that any physical pain was caused to any of the
Plaintiffs.

20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Exhibit 20, Deposition of Walter Semidey, dated April 21,1994, pg 35, lines 3-6
Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, pg 20, lines 3Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, page 28, lines 13-16
Exhibit 21, Deposition of Jose Humberto Bardales, dated April 21,1994, pg 42, lines 11-13
Exhibit 21, Deposition of Jose Humberto Bardales, dated April 21,1994, pg 42, lines 14-18
Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, pg 28, lines 13-16
Exhibit 21 Deposition of Jose Humberto Bardales, pg 42, lines 14-18, and, Exhibit 6 Memorandum Decision
filed May 25, 1995, R 696-685 at R 688, paragraph 17
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14.

There is no evidence or testimony that the supervisors' checking was

performed with anger.
15.

There is no evidence or testimony that any of the Plaintiffs had any

fear that they would be injured in any way. There is no evidence or testimony that
there was any reason to fear injury.

There is no evidence or testimony that any

injury was intended. 27
The Plaintiffs motivation for filing the action.
16.

The Plaintiff Semidey, described his reason or motivation for the filing

of the complaint. He said: "The sole reason for us being here is the feeling of offense
as a result of this conduct, meaning the search incident." 28
There was no notice to Defendants of any claim.
17.

Until the Complaint was filed with the Court, no Plaintiff objected

about the incident to any DOT supervisor or officer.
18.

No objection was received by DOT until the Complaint was filed m o r e

than nine months after the incident.
Proceedings in the trial court - first Motion For Summary Judgment.
19.

On July 11, 1994, Defendants filed a Motion For Summary Judgment,

asking the Court to dismiss the action against Defendant Lynton personally, because
DOT was a Nevada corporation and Lynton was not personally liable for the
corporate actions of DOT.29 The Motion was supported by a Memorandum. 30

27

28
29
30

Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25, 1995, R 696-685, at R 689-688, para. 16, and Exhibit 22,
Deposition of Angel Santiago, dated April 20,1994, pg. 40, lines 3-7
Exhibit 20, Deposition of Walter Semidey, dated April 21,1994, page 59, lines 14-17
Exhibit 7, Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike, filed July 11,1994, R138-136
Exhibit 8, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike filed July 11,1994,
R 127-119
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20.
Plaintiffs'

The Plaintiffs filed their response to the motion under the caption of
Objection To Defendant

Lynton's

Motion

For Partial

Summary

Judgment. 31
21.

Plaintiffs' response claimed that there were disputed issues of fact, but

the response did not raise any issues of fact by reference to any sworn testimony or
admissible evidence.32
22.

In reality, Plaintiffs' response merely argued that "DOT Adventures," a

Nevada Corporation, which qualified to do business in Utah under the name "DOT
Adventures, Inc." is not be the same corporation because the word "Inc." was added
to the end of the name on the Utah Certificate of Authority.33
23.

Plaintiffs' response admitted the existence of the Nevada Corporation

"DOT Adventures," and attached a copy of the Nevada Certificate of Corporate
Status to Plaintiffs' response.34
24.

Defendants Reply Memorandum In Support Of Defendant Lynton's

Motion For Summary Judgment,35 provided certified copies of official documents
from the State of Nevada and the State of Utah demonstrating that the Utah
Certificate Of Authority, 36 was issued based upon the application filed by DOT

Exhibit 9, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant Lynton's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, filed July 19,1994,
R 218-178
Exhibit 9, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant Lynton's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, filed July 19,1994,
R 218-178
Exhibit 9, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant Lynton's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, filed July 19,1994,
R 218-178, at R 218-215
Exhibit 9, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant Lynton's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, filed July 19,1994,
R 218-178 at R 199-198
Exhibit 10, Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant Lynton's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, filed August 8,1994, R 252-229
Exhibit 4, Certified Copy of the Certificate of Authority and Certificate of Corporate Status, R 231-229, at
R 231

9

Adventures, a Nevada Corporation.37 Utah laws38 require inclusion of "Inc.",
Nevada law39 does not. Appellants7 entire case against Ms. Lynton personally, relied
solely upon Appellants most unique double or two corporation theory. Before the
trial court, Appellants vigerously argued that there were two corporations, one of
which was DOT Adventrues, Inc., (a Utah corporation) and the other of which was
DOT Adventures (a Nevada corporation). Appellants never produced any evidence
in law or fact as to the "Inc."
25.

Based upon certified copies of the Utah Certificate Of Authority and its

underlying application, which documents were not disputed, the trial court
concluded, that "DOT Adventures," a Nevada Corporation, had qualified to do
business in Utah under the name "DOT Adventures, Inc.," as required by Utah law,
and that under the provisions of §16-10A-1502(6), UCA, a foreign corporation does
not lose its corporate status by doing business prior to receipt of the Utah Certificate
Of Authority.
26.

The trial court also concluded, as a matter of law, that the Defendant

Lynton, knowing nothing of the incident and not being present at the time of the
incident, had no part in the alleged incident and that she was not personally liable
merely because she was a stockholder, officer and/or director of the corporation.

Exhibit 4, Certified Copy of the Certificate of Authority and Certificate of Corporate Status, R 231-229, at
R 230
Utah Code Annotated, §16-10a-401, The name of a corporation: (a) must contain the word "corporation," or
"company," or the abbreviation "corp." "inc.," or "co.," or words or abbreviations of like import in another
language.
See: Nevada Corporation Law, §§78.039 through 78.045. It is impossible to prove a negitive. No Nevada law
requires the use of "Inc." in the name of any corporation. Appellants have not shown and are unable to base
any double or two corporation theory upon such an argument. Appellants have produced no evidence
otherwise.
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The trial court granted a partial summary judgment, dismissing the action against
Defendant Lynton personally. 40
Proceedings in the trial court - Defendant's second Motion For Summary judgment.
27.

On October 11,1994, Defendants filed a motion for summary j u d g m e n t

as to all remaining issues and as to all the remaining Defendants. The Motion was
supported by a memorandum. 4 1
28.

In Plaintiffs' response, entitled Objection to Defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment dated 11/1/94, 42 Plaintiffs provided a so-called "Statement Of
Disputed Facts," but the Plaintiffs' statement did not provide any testimony to
contest Defendants' recitation of facts, and it did not dispute the material facts
recited by Defendant's Memorandum. 4 3
29.

Plaintiffs' response did not comply in any respect with Rule 4-501(2)(b)

Code Of Judicial Administration.

There is not one single reference in Defendant's

Response to any paragraph contained in Defendants' Statement Of Facts.44
30.

Plaintiffs' response relied upon affidavits which contain summaries of

hearsay conversations, without foundation. As an example, Plaintiffs argue in their
statement of facts that Esquivel demanded the search as a "deliberate and calculated
insult ..., "45 but Plaintiffs do not support the hearsay conclusion with admissible
testimony. In the next paragraph of Plaintiff's so-called statement of facts, Plaintiffs

Exhibit 2, Order filed September 9,1994, R 304-303, and Exhibit 24, Hearing Transcript dated February 10,
1995, R 757-789, at R 750-751, lines 4-17
Exhibit 11, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment - Failure to State Cause of
Action, filed October 13, 1994, R 341-315
Exhibit 12, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November 1,1994, R 418344 at R 418-399
Exhibit 12, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November 1,1994, R 418344 at R 418-413
Exhibit 12, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November 1,1994, R 418344 at R 418-413
Exhibit 12, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November 1,1994, R 418344, at R 414
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argue, in the alternative, that if the statement is not true, the following alternative
statement is true:
18.
In the alternative, Mr. Esquivel acted in deliberate and
intentional disregard of the emotional distress and humiliation caused
by his insulting behavior ... .46
31.

The statement made in paragraph 18 quoted above is not supported by

reference to sworn testimony or evidence.
32.

Plaintiffs m e m o r a n d u m did not provide the court with evidence or

testimony to demonstrate that there were any issues of fact.

The m e m o r a n d u m

merely argued Plaintiffs' position.
33.

Plaintiffs' memorandum could have alleged that all the Plaintiffs were

touched during the alleged search, but Plaintiffs' statement of facts does not claim
they all were touched. To the contrary, Plaintiffs' Memorandum admits:
20.
The male supervisor did not physically touch most of the
male workers. 47
34.

There were numerous male workers at the Plant. Only three of those

male workers have joined in this action.
35.

Plaintiffs' memorandum does not allege that Santiago (one of the male

plaintiffs) was touched. Santiago's supporting affidavit does not claim that he was
touched. 48
36.

Plaintiffs' m e m o r a n d u m does allege that Mazariegos, the only female

Plaintiff was touched.

While the Memorandum

alleges that each female was

touched by the female supervisor, there is no support for the claim.

46

47

48

The only

Exhibit 12, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants 7 Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November 1,1994, R 418344, at R 414
Exhibit 12, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November 1,1994, R 418344, at R 414
Exhibit 12, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November 1,1994, R 418344, at Santiago Affidavit, R 374-372
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affidavit signed by a female which alleges a female was touched is the Mazariegos
affidavit which states:
When it was my turn to enter the bathroom the supervisor made m e
unbutton my pants and loosen my blouse. She also made me undo my
bra. Then she stuck her hands under my blouse and ran her hands all
over the area of my waist and even under my bra. Then she told me to
take off my shoes and socks, and to roll my pants legs up above m y
knees. Last of all, she stuck a pencil in my hair and searched t h r o u g h
all my hair with a pencil. 49
37.

Plaintiffs' m e m o r a n d u m admits that not one of the factory workers

raised their hands to object to the check or search. 50
38.

Plaintiffs' m e m o r a n d u m argues that the Plaintiffs did not consent to

the check or to the search, but they nonetheless permitted it to happen due to fear.51
39.

Plaintiffs'

memorandum

does not demonstrate

that any of

the

Plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress or any specific injury.
40.

The Mazariegos affidavit contains nothing more than a summary or

conclusion that Mazariegos, although she continued

employment

with

DOT,

couldn't work after the incident. 52
41.

At the hearing on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

held on February 10, 1995,53 the trial court expressed concern that

Plaintiffs'

m e m o r a n d u m did not raise any issues of fact and that the trial court repeatedly
asked Plaintiffs' counsel to tell the trial court what evidence she had to support the
basic elements of her allegations.

Exhibit 12, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November
344, at Mazariegos Affidavit, R 382-379
Exhibit 12, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November
344, at R 415, para 14
Exhibit 12, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November
344, at R 413, para 23
Exhibit 12, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November
344, at Mazariegos Affidavit, R 382-379
Exhibit 24, Hearing Transcript dated February 10,1995, R 757-789, beginning at 776
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1,1994, R 4181,1994, R 4181,1994, R 4181,1994, R 418-

42.

At the hearing, the trial court advised Plaintiffs' counsel that she had

not provided sufficient evidence of the individual elements of proof required to
establish a prima facie

case, as to the various causes of action alleged by Plaintiffs,

and if Plaintiffs did not provide the m i n i m u m

evidence required, as to each

element of proof required to establish a prima facie case, the trial court would h a v e
to grant Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment.
43.

In A d d e n d u m "A" attached hereto, the Defendants have provided a

synopsis of the conversation between the trial court and Plaintiff's counsel, whereby
the trial court attempted to educate Plaintiff's counsel and explain to her what she
would have to establish in order to avoid having the various causes of action
dismissed.

The trial court went through virtually every cause of action

and

reiterated every element of proof required in an effort to assist Plaintiffs' counsel.
44.

The court entered an Interim

Order dated 2/24/95 granting

the

Plaintiffs additional time within which to present sufficient facts a n d / o r testimony
necessary to defeat Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment. 5 4

The Order

provided, among other things:
1.
The Court grants Plaintiffs until March 13, 1995, to show
any basis they may have as to why this matter should continue, and
that full Summary Judgment as requested by Defendants should not be
granted as to all remaining alleged causes of action. As a m i n i m u m ,
Plaintiff shall provide the following:
a) a list of witnesses for trial and a proffer as to what each
witness will say, including the specifics as to what they
will say about their damages, along with supporting
corroboration or expert witnesses, if any;
b) any tangible evidence that would support Plaintiff's
claim for damages; and
c) any appropriate testimony to be presented at trial. 55

Exhibit 25, Interim Order Regarding Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, filed February 24,1995,
R 476-474
Exhibit 25, Interim Order Regarding Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, filed February 24,1995,
R 476-474
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45.

As permitted by the Trial Court's Order, Plaintiffs submitted additional

documents. 5 6 The additional documents submitted by the Plaintiffs consisted of the
following:
a. A Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' Motion 5 7 , entitled
Plaintiffs' Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for S u m m a r y
Judgment, filed March 13, 1995 and did not provide any additional
testimony or evidence.

The Plaintiff

also filed an additional

m e m o r a n d u m entitled Plaintiffs' (Amended) Second Objection to
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 23, 1995.
This m e m o r a n d u m did not provide any additional testimony or
evidence.
b. A psychological opinion regarding all the Plaintiffs, contained i n
one letter from a Juan A. Mejia, who interviewed all the Plaintiffs,
one by one, on February 18-19, 1995, more than two years after the
alleged incident. 58
c. An

affidavit

of Linda J. Gummow

who

apparently

did

not

interview any of the Plaintiffs, but who stated, in her affidavit, that
she reviewed the opinion of Juan A. Mejia and she reviewed a n
"English translation of statements of the ... individuals."

The

statements were not attached to the affidavit.59

Exhibit 14, Plaintiffs' Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 13,1995,
R 513-477 and Exhibit 15, Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
filed March 23, 1995, R 604-544
Exhibit 14, Plaintiffs' Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 13,1995,
R 513-477
See Exhibit 15, Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March
23, 1995, R 604-544 at The Psychological Evaluation of Juan A. Mejia, MD, at R 582-573
Exhibit 15, Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 23,
1995, R 604-544 at The Affidavit of Linda J. Gummow, R 572-570
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d. Copies of Amended English translations of Plaintiffs'

affidavits

which were originally before the trial court and which the trial
court had already concluded were insufficient.60
46.
newly

Defendants' filed a Motion to Strike a n d / o r to Disregard Portions of the

presented

Plaintiffs'

Affidavits. 61

The

Motion

was

supported

by

a

Memorandum. 6 2
47.

As

Defendant's

translations of the affidavits

Memorandum

demonstrated,

submitted by the individual

the

Plaintiffs

amended
contained

statements which contradicted the Plaintiffs' prior sworn deposition testimony and
rather than creating an issue of fact, the Plaintiffs' affidavits merely demonstrated
that the individual Plaintiffs had made contradictory statements about the events. 6 3
The amended translations did not provide any additional information

which

demonstrated that genuine issues of fact precluded the granting of Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment. 64
48.

The Defendants responded by submitting what amounted to their reply

memorandum to the supplemental responses provided by Plaintiffs.65
49.

The trial court then issued a detailed Memorandum Decision dated

5/22/95 in which the trial court analyzed each cause of action asserted by Plaintiffs,
and each essential element of a prima facie

case which Plaintiffs would have to

demonstrate, as to each cause of action, and the trial court determined that the
Plaintiffs had failed to provide admissible testimony or evidence to support one or
60

61

62

63

64

65

Exhibit 15, Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 23,
1995, R 604-544 at the English Translations of Affidavits, R 567-545
Exhibit 16, Defendants' Motion to Strike a n d / o r to Disregard Portions of Plaintiffs' Affidavits, filed April 26,
1995, R 630-629
Exhibit 17, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike a n d / o r to Disregard Portions of
Plaintiffs' Affidavits, filed April 26, 1995, R 628-618
Exhibit 17, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike a n d / o r to Disregard Portions of
Plaintiffs' Affidavits, filed April 26, 1995, R 628-618, at R 626-621
Exhibit 17, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike a n d / o r to Disregard Portions of
Plaintiffs' Affidavits, filed April 26, 1995, R 628-618, at R 620-618
Exhibit 18, Reply to Plaintiffs' Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 3,
1995, R 617-606
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more of the essential elements of each cause of action and so there was no basis
upon which the Court could deny Summary Judgment and require a trial.66
50.

On July 14, 1995, the court signed its Order dismissing the case.67
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

DOT was and is a Nevada corporation, in good standing, doing business in
Utah. While DOT did not obtain its Certificate Of Authority from the Utah Division
Of Corporations until two weeks after the incident which is the subject matter of
this action, DOT nonetheless was a corporation and the stockholders, officers and
directors of the corporation were not personally liable for the obligations a n d / o r
debts of the corporation.
The trial court was correct in determining that Lynton, as a stockholder,
officers and director was not personally liable to the Plaintiffs for the alleged actions
of Esquivel, the plant manager.
Plaintiffs

failed to demonstrate that they had admissible testimony

or

evidence which could establish each essential element required to present a prima
facie case, in regard to each cause of action, at trial.
In addition, Plaintiffs failed to raise an issue of a material fact which would
preclude the trial court from granting Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AND FOURTH CAUSES OF
ACTION SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
Unlawful detention, a criminal offense, is not the basis for a civil cause of action.
The Utah Code Ann. §76-5-304 provides as follows:

Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25,1995, R 696-685
Exhibit 3, Order filed July 14,1995, R 703-701
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(1) A person commits unlawful detention if he knowingly restrains
another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with his
liberty.
(2) Unlawful detention is a class B misdemeanor.
"Unlawful Detention," under the Utah Code Annotated, §76-5-304, is a crime,
but the Utah Criminal Code does not establish a civil liability or a civil penalty. In
order to establish "false imprisonment" a person must demonstrate that force or the
threat of force coupled with a reasonable apprehension of the use of force were
utilized to detain or restrain the person.
In Mildon v. Bybee, 13 Utah 2d 400, 375 P.2d 458 (1962), a claim of malicious
prosecution was made against a Deputy Sheriff, who, armed with a warrant of arrest
for one person, mistakenly took another into custody and drove away with him in
the officer's car. In reviewing a directed verdict of no cause of action, the Utah
Supreme Court equated false imprisonment with unlawful detention and stated:
Nevertheless, false imprisonment occurs whenever there
unlawful detention or restraint of another against his will.
(Id. at 459.)

is

an

In Hepworth v. Covey Bros. Amusement Co., 97 Utah 205, 91 P.2d 507, the
Utah Supreme Court said:
We wish to invite attention to a distinction in the law which we
believe has been confused in the briefs. False arrest may be committed
only by one who has legal authority to arrest or who has pretended
legal authority to arrest. False imprisonment may be committed by
anyone who imprisons without a legal right
"Any exercise of force, or express or implied threat of force, by
which in fact the other person is deprived of his liberty, compelled to
remain where he does not wish to remain or go where he does not
wish to go, is an imprisonment. * * * The essential thing is the
restraint of the person. * * * If the words or conduct are such as to
induce a reasonable apprehension of force, and the means of coercion
are at hand, a person may be as effectually restrained and deprived of
liberty as by prison bars. * * *" 11 R.C.L. 793, 794, sec. 5.
(Id. at 509.)
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In order for the restraint to be "unlawful", the restraint must be imposed with
force or with the threat of force coupled with a reasonable apprehension that force
will be used if the person being restrained does not comply.
Plaintiffs' Brief relies upon and cites Hepworth, 6 8 and argues that "there was
no evidence or force, other than the authority of the floorwalkers and their police
uniforms." 6 9

However, in Hepworth, a city police officer, in uniform

searched

Hepworth, arrested Hepworth and told him that if he didn't accompany the police
officer and cooperate, the police officer would take Hepworth to the police station to
book him. Plaintiffs' Memorandum urges the Court to believe that Hepworth, w h o
was arrested, by a policeman in uniform, was not restrained by force or threat of
force. However, a person who has been arrested, must presume that he is held by
force or threat of force.

Hepworth does not support Plaintiffs' argument

that

whether Plaintiffs were restrained by force is a jury question because in the case at
hand, the Plaintiffs were not arrested by a policeman in uniform.
Hepworth relies upon the assumption that false arrest automatically gives
rise to a presumption of false imprisonment.

Hepworth at page 509 says: "False

arrest is merely one means of committing a false imprisonment."
In the case at hand, in order to establish a prima facie case, the Plaintiffs m u s t
demonstrate, as a matter of fact, that they were "unlawfully detained." According to
the rule of law in Hepworth cited above, the Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they
were restrained and deprived of liberty by force or the threat and a reasonable
apprehension of force.
The depositions of the Plaintiffs demonstrate that no Plaintiff was detained or
restrained by force or the threat of force. When asked if anyone had locked the

Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, pgs. 21-22
Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, pg. 22
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doors so she could not leave or if anyone had used threatening words, Mazariegos'
response was: "No."70
Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action is for "Wrongful Detention" 7 1 and in support
thereof the Complaint alleges that Defendant Esquivel unlawfully

detained the

Plaintiffs. In the trial court's detailed Memorandum Decision, the court noted the
fact that the doors remained unlocked. The court further noted that Plaintiffs had
no evidence against Defendants of any threat or force to detain the Plaintiffs. 72
Plaintiffs had no evidence that "defendants substantially interfered with plaintiffs'
liberty. Plaintiffs knew the location of an exit and made no attempt to leave."73
The Plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action is for "False Imprisonment" 7 4 and in
support thereof

the Complaint

detained" the Plaintiffs.

alleges that Defendant

Esquivel

"unlawfully

Plaintiffs' First and Fourth Causes of action against the

Defendants, are one and the same.
The only evidence provided to the trial court demonstrated that no force or
threat of force was used and any of the Plaintiffs could have left at any time.

The

Trial Court observed:
17.
As to plaintiffs'
fourth
cause of action,
false
imprisonment, the Court again finds no evidence that plaintiffs were
confined. Plaintiffs were aware of an exit, and plaintiffs were not
physically restrained. Plaintiffs did not attempt to discover whether
the door was locked and did not attempt to leave. The Court further
finds that defendants did not falsely imprison plaintiffs by any threat of
force. . . .75
Plaintiffs argue that they chose not to leave the premises because they didn't
want to lose their jobs. 76 The argument made by Plaintiffs that they chose not to
Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, pg. 28, lines 13-18
Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs' Amended complaint filed June 13,1994, R 107-99, at R 105, paras 15-17
Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25, 1995, R 696-685, at R 689-688, at R 692, para. 8
Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25,1995, R 696-685, at R 689-688, at R 692, para. 15
Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs' Amended complaint filed June 13,1994, R 107-99, at R 104, paras 30-32
Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25,1995, R 696-685, at R 689-688, at R 688, para. 17
Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, pg. 12
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leave, constitutes an admission that the Plaintiffs were free to leave, they simply
chose not to leave.
Plaintiffs did not have a prima facie

case of wrongful detention or false

imprisonment. The trial court was correct in determining that Plaintiffs' lacked the
evidence required to establish the essential elements of a case of wrongful detention
or false imprisonment and the two causes of action should have been dismissed.
POINT 2
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR ASSAULT
AND PLAINTIFFS' THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BATTERY
MUST BE DISMISSED.
An "assault" requires a threat of force and bodily harm coupled with a wrongful act.
In 6A C.J.S. Assault & Battery §2, at pages 316-317, the definition of assault is
as follows:
An assault may be defined as any intentional, unlawful offer of
corporal injury to another by force, or force unlawfully directed toward
the person of another, under such circumstances as create a well
founded fear of imminent peril, coupled with the apparent present
ability to effectuate the attempt if not prevented. Also the term has
been defined as an unlawful attempt, coupled with the present ability,
to commit a violent injury on the person of another; an attempt or
offer, with force or violence, to do a corporal hurt to another, whether
from malice or wantonness, under such circumstances as denote, at the
time, an intention to do it, coupled with a present ability to effectuate
such intention.
In State v. Barkas, 91 Utah 574, 65 P.2d 1130 (1937) the Utah Supreme Court, in
accord with the foregoing definition stated:
It is too elemental to require argument, that to point a loaded revolver
at another to frighten or wound him constitutes an assault . . . .
(Id. at 1132.)
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To constitute an "assault" there must be a wrongful act. In 6A C.J.S. Assault
& Battery §8, at pg. 328, citing the Utah case of Ganaway v. Salt Lake Dramatic
Association, 17 Utah 37, 53 P. 830, the following comment is found:
There can, however, be no assault or assault and battery w i t h o u t
a wrongful act. It is not every touching or laying on of hands that
constitutes an assault and battery; to gently touch another for the
purpose of doing a lawful act does not amount to an assault and
battery; the touching of, or injury to, another must be done in an angry,
revengeful, rude, or insolent manner so as to render the act unlawful.
Similarly, an accidental hurt, in which the actor is blameless, does n o t
amount to a battery.
A cause of action for battery is based upon an allegation and the establishment
of intent, malice, anger, etc.

In 6A C.J.S. Assault & Battery §8, at pg. 329 the

following is found:
Generally, intent is an essential element in an action for assault
and battery. More precisely, it is the rule that intent is the gist of the
action only where the battery was committed in the performance of a n
act not otherwise unlawful; or as it is sometimes stated, there is n o
assault and battery unless the touching was with intent to injure, or
unless defendant was otherwise engaged in a trespass or other
unlawful transaction at the time of the act complained of. . . .
There can, however, be no assault or assault and battery w i t h o u t
a wrongful act. . . .
Utah is in accord with the common law cited above to the effect that there
must be intent to injure or harm in order to constitute an assault or a battery.

In

Morgan v. Pistone. 25 Utah 2d 63, 475 P.2d 839 (1970), the Utah Supreme Court held
that a doctor who touched a minor, young lady neighbor, to emphasize his point of
view was not guilty of an assault or battery. The Court stated:
Plaintiff, a minor female at the time of the alleged terrifying touching,
and an adult at time of the trial, said one thing, and defendant, an adult
male, said another, i.e., that he touched simply to call attention by way
of explanation that he, a doctor, disliked the degradation attendant o n
plaintiff's repeated suggestions that his role in society best could be
described by the sound of a d u c k . . . .
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On such highly emotional and controversial evidence the jury
apparently believed the doctor was put upon with greater force and
vigor, by the plaintiff's unkind, opprobrious epithets than was the
plaintiff by the gentle touching designed only to warn, not to w o u n d .
Hence we cannot say that the jury erred in finding that there was not
that kind of intentional touching amounting to a technical battery.
(Id. at 839-840.)
In the case at hand, Plaintiffs Complaint, Second Cause of Action for Assault
does not allege a wrongful act or the threat of bodily harm or violence.

The

Complaint alleges:
27.
By requiring that all employees submit to a physical search
of their person and belongings before being allowed to leave the
premises, Mr. Esquivel intentionally created in all non-supervisory
employees the reasonable apprehension of harmful or offensive
touching. 77
Absent an allegation, supported by testimony or evidence that Defendant
Esquivel engaged in any threats a n d / o r acts of bodily harm or violence,

the

Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action for assault must be dismissed.
Plaintiff's Complaint, Third Cause of Action for Battery does not allege an
intent to injure or harm. The Complaint alleges:
29.
By requiring all supervisors to physically search the
person and property of all employees, Mr. Esquivel intentionally
caused the harmful or offensive touching of all non-supervisory
employees. 78
As to Plaintiffs cause of action for "battery," Mazariegos is the only Plaintiff
who claims to have been touched. As to all the other Plaintiffs the cause of action
for battery must be dismissed because they don't even claim to have been touched.
Mazariegos testified in her deposition that she was in fact touched, but not in
such a way as to cause harm or injury.79 The trial court observed:

Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs' Amended complaint filed June 13,1994, R 107-99, at R 103, para. 27
Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs' Amended complaint filed June 13,1994, R 107-99, at R 104, para. 21
Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, pgs. 20, lines 15-25 and page 21, lines 1-2
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16.
As to plaintiffs' second and third causes of action, assault
and battery, the Court does not find any evidence that defendants
threatened plaintiffs with any violence or harm. According to the
Model Utah Jury Instructions, intention to cause harmful or offensive
contact or imminent apprehensions of such is one of the elements of
assault. See M.U.J.I. 10.18 (Assault Elements). The Court finds n o
evidence that defendant Esquivel intended the search of plaintiffs to
cause harmful or offensive contact, or to cause plaintiffs to be i n
imminent apprehension of such contact. In fact, the deposition
testimony indicates that plaintiffs understood that defendant Esquivel
intended the search to recover a fellow employee's stolen property. . . .
The Court further finds no evidence that defendant Esquivel intended
to cause acts of bodily harm or violence, and no evidence that Esquivel
attempted to or threatened to cause injury or harm. 80
Absent an allegation, supported by testimony or evidence that Defendant
Esquivel caused a touching of Mazariegos with an intent to injure or harm, or cause
acts of bodily harm or violence, the Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action must be
dismissed against her and all the other Plaintiffs.
The trial court was correct in determining that Plaintiffs
evidence to establish the essential elements of a prima facie

did not

have

case of assault and

battery.
Having determined that no assault or battery could be established, it was not
necessary for the trial court to consider whether Plaintiffs suffered

damages.

Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief cites Hepworth v. Covey Bros. Amusement Co., 91. P.2d
507 (Utah 1939) and Teppsen v. Tensen. 155 P.2d 429 (Utah 1916), as well as other
cases/ 1 for the proposition that proof of damages is not required in order to recover
nominal damages in assault and battery cases.

Since no assault or battery was

established by Plaintiffs, the matter never advanced to the issue of damages, and
Plaintiffs' reliance upon the cases allowing nominal damages in assault and battery
cases, is not well taken.
Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25,1995, R 696-685, at R 689-688, para. 16
Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, pgs. 44-45
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POINT NO. 3
PLAINTIFFS GAVE THEIR CONSENT TO BE TOUCHED. AND
CONSENT IS AN ABSOLUTE DEFENSE TO A CLAIM OF ASSAULT
AND BATTERY. AND PLAINTIFFS' SECOND AND THIRD CAUSES
OF ACTION MUST BE DISMISSED.
In 6A C.J.S. Assault & Battery §16, at pgs. 337-338 the defense of consent is set
forth as follows:
It is a defense to an action for assault or an assault or battery that
the injured party consented to, or participated in, the acts causing the
injury, and such consent may be either express or implied. This is the
rule at least in cases where life and limb are not exposed to serious
danger in the common course of things, and where the damaged
inflicted have not exceeded the bounds of the consent or invitation. . . .
It is a general rule that one cannot maintain an action for a wrong occasioned
by an act to which he has consented, under the familiar maxim "volenti

non fit

injurie," except where the act involves the life or person, or a breach of the peace, or
amounts to a public offense.82
According to the Restatement of Torts:
(1) Consent is willingness in fact for conduct to occur. It may be
manifested by action or inaction and need not be communicated
to the actor.
(2) If words or conduct are reasonably understood by another to be
intended as consent, they constitute apparent consent and are as
effective as consent in fact.83
In the case at hand, the sworn deposition testimony of the Plaintiffs was as
follows:
Santiago was not touched by anyone. 84 But he was asked to take out his wallet
and to empty his pockets. 85 He testified the checking "was voluntary," 8 6 but he also
82
83
84
85
86

74 Am Jur 2d, Torts, §49
Restatement, Torts 2d §892
Exhibit 22, Deposition of Angel Santiago, dated April 20,1994, pg. 33, lines 3 - 4
Exhibit 22, Deposition of Angel Santiago, dated April 20,1994, pg. 32, lines 13-15
Exhibit 22, Deposition of Angel Santiago, dated April 20,1994, pg. 35, lines 9-11
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added he was concerned that if he didn't voluntarily consent to the check he might
lose his job or others might think he took the money.87
Bardales indicated he did not object to being searched and consented to the
search. He stated:
I had this coat on. I was wearing a coat. I opened it in the way
that I had it opened so that he could see the pockets and tell that there
wasn't anything there.
I asked him if he wanted me to do anything else. I asked him if
he wanted me to take off my shoes or anything else. He said, No, that
was sufficient. Then I left, and the next person went in.88
Mazariegos testified that when she was asked to raise her hand if she objected
to the search, she did not raise her hand. 89 She admitted that she was not touched
with intent to injure or offend and stated that her supervisor (Cookie) only touched
the bra and not her breasts.90
Semidey testified that he along with everyone else went into the bathrooms
voluntarily.
Q. Did you ever see any forced used against any person to facilitate
the search?
A. (By the translator) No, because the men went into the men's
bathroom and the women into the women's. We went in
voluntarily. 91
Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief argues that whether a person gives their consent is
a jury question and cannot be decided on a motion for summary judgment. 92
However, the testimony of the Plaintiffs themselves

indicates that they all

outwardly demonstrated their consent to be checked or searched. The Trial Court
stated:
Exhibit 22, Deposition of Angel Santiago, dated April 20,1994, pg 35, lines 9-11
Exhibit 21, Deposition of Jose Humberto Bardales, dated April 21,1994, pg 40, lines 20-25 and pg 41, lines 1-2
Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, pg 17, lines 14-17
Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, pg 44, line 25 and pg 45, lines 1-3
Exhibit 20, Deposition of Walter Semidey, dated April 21,1994, pg 43, lines 3-7
Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, pgs 17-18
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plaintiffs voluntarily remained and submitted to the search. Even if
plaintiffs were afraid of losing their employment, they submitted to the
search without objecting or without attempting to leave the premises. 93
Whether Plaintiffs inwardly resented the search or not, is not relevant.

The

fact is that no Plaintiff objected and each Plaintiff voluntarily consented to be
searched.

There is no evidence to the contrary.

As a matter of uncontested,

undisputed fact, Defendants have established their Defense of Consent and the
Plaintiffs' Second and Third Causes of Action must be dismissed.
POINT 4
PLAINTIFFS' FIFTH AND SIXTH CAUSES OF A C T I O N INTENTIONAL AND RECKLESS INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS MUST BE DISMISSED
In Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961), the Utah Supreme
Court established the rule of law concerning claims for emotional distress.
Court stated:
Our study of the authorities, and of the arguments advanced,
convinces us that, conceding such a cause of action may not be based
upon mere negligence, the best considered view recognizes an action
for severe emotional distress, though not accompanied by bodily
impact or physical injury, where the defendant intentionally engaged
in some conduct toward the plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of inflicting
emotional distress, or (b) where any reasonable person would h a v e
known that such would result; and his actions are of such a nature as
to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against
the generally accepted standards of decency and morality. This test
seems to be a more realistic safeguard against false claims than to insist
upon finding some other attendant tort, which may be of m i n o r
character, or fictional.
(Id. at 347.)

Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25,1995, R 696-685
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The

Samms v. Eccles, goes so far as to say that even though a person's conduct
may be extremely offensive to another person, that in and of itself is not sufficient to
create a cause of action in Utah. In Samms v. Eccles the Court said:
We quite agree with the idea that under usual circumstances the
solicitation to sexual intercourse would not be actionable even t h o u g h
it may be offensive to the offeree.
(Id. at 347.)
The landmark case of Samms v. Eccles has been followed in numerous Utah
cases. See Russell v. Thompson Newspapers, Inc., 200 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 842 P.2d
896 (1992). In Reiser v. Lohner. 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982), citing Samms v. Eccles. the
Utah Supreme Court stated:
It is well established in Utah that a cause of action for emotional
distress may not be based upon mere negligence. . . .
In the instant case, there is not so much as an allegation that
defendants intended in any way to harm plaintiffs or any one of t h e m .
The summary judgment was therefore proper. [Emphasis added.]
(Id. at 100.)
In White v. Blackburn, 128 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 787 P.2d 1315, (1990), the Utah
Court of Appeals stated:
To support a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, appellant must show the following elements:
(1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant's intent to
cause, or the reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional
distress; (3) severe emotional distress; and (4) an actual and proximate
causal link between the tortious conduct and the emotional distress. . . .
(Id. at 21.)
In Retherford v. AT & T Communications, 200 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 844 P.2d
949 (1992), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
To sustain her claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, Retherford must show that (i) Gailey's, Randall's, Johnson's,
and Bateson-Hough's conduct was outrageous and intolerable in that it
offended against the generally accepted standards of decency and
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morality; (ii) they intended to cause, or acted in reckless disregard of the
likelihood of causing, emotional distress; (iii) Retherford suffered
severe emotional distress; and (iv) their conduct proximately caused
Retherford's emotional distress. . . .
(Id. at 33.)
In Sperber v. The Galigher Ash Company, 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 747 P.2d 1025
(1987), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Although Sperber does not allege that Galigher Ash Co. discharged
him with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress upon him, h e
does assert that the company's conduct was "intentional, malicious and
in reckless and wanton disregard of the effect of such c o n d u c t . . . " or, in
other words, that Galigher Ash knew that its conduct would cause
emotional distress. To state a claim, however, a plaintiff m u s t
additionally allege conduct on the part of the defendant that is
outrageous and intolerable to the extent that it offends societal
standards of morality and decency.
(Id. at 4.)
In the case at hand the Plaintiffs Complaint alleges as follows:
34.
Defendant Esquivel's extreme and outrageous actions, in
requiring every employee to submit to the indignity of a physical
search, intentionally and recklessly inflicted upon the Plaintiffs in this
action severe emotional distress.
35.
Defendant Esquivel knew, or should have known, that
there was a reasonable likelihood that subjecting all employees to a
physical search of their person and property would cause them severe
emotional distress. 94
Intention to harm is a prerequisite under Reiser v. Lohner. Under the rule
established in Reiser v. Lohner, the complaint must allege intentional conduct i n
order to state a claim for relief for severe emotional distress. In the alternative, if
intention to harm is not alleged, the plaintiff must allege that any reasonable person
would have known the conduct was "of such a nature as to be considered

Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint filed June 13,1994, R 107-99, at R 102, paras 34 and 35
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outrageous and intolerable in that they offend

against the generally accepted

standards of decency and morality." 95
Liability for emotional distress does not extend to mere insults, indignities,
threats, annoyances, petty oppression, or other trivialities. There is no occasion for
the law to intervene in every case where some one's feelings are hurt. 96
In the case at hand, while the caption in the Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action
contains the word "INTENTIONAL," there is no language in the complaint which
claims the conduct of Esquivel was intentional,

intending

to cause

injury.

Paragraph 27 clearly refers only to negligent conduct; and, under the rule in S a m m s
v. Eccles and Reiser v. Lohner negligent conduct, even reckless negligent conduct is
not sufficient to sustain a claim for emotional distress in Utah.

There is n o

allegation in the complaint that the conduct was so "outrageous and intolerable"
that it offended "against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality."
Plaintiffs cite Boies v. Raynor, 361 P.2d 1 (Ariz. 1961) for the proposition that a
person's mental state constitutes admissible evidence of damages. 97 However, Boies
v. Raynor is not controlling Utah law, and does not impose upon the trial court, in
the case at hand, a duty to hold that any mental suffering, fright, or shame, n o
matter how slight, constitutes a sufficient basis to require a trial court to submit
Plaintiffs' claims to a jury.
Taking the required elements of proof one at a time, as established in W h i t e
v. Blackburn: there was no evidence that Esquivel's conduct was "outrageous."
There was no evidence that Esquivel acted with an intent to cause emotional
distress. There was no evidence that Esquivel acted with "reckless disregard" of the
probability of causing emotional distress.

There was no evidence that Plaintiffs

suffered "severe emotional distress." While the Plaintiffs, two years after the fact,
95
96
97

Samms v. Eccles, at page 347
Restatement, Torts 2d, Emotional Distress, Comment to §46
Plaintiffs Appellate Brief, pgs. 40-41
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allege that as a direct result of the incident they all felt bad, there was no evidence
that Esquivel's conduct was the proximate cause of severe emotional distress.
Alternatively, if Plaintiffs had alleged, in their Amended Complaint, that
Esquivel intended to harm the Plaintiffs a n d / o r that Esquivel's conduct was so
offensive that it was "against the standards of decency and morality," there wasn't
any evidence before the trial court to support either of the two alternative
allegations, so as to create a factual question which needed to be resolved by a trial.
Mazariegos testified that she knew the purpose of the checking was to find the
money and that she was offended because of the inquiry, not because of Esquivel's
conduct. Her testimony was as follows:
Q. Do you believe that the purpose of the checking was to offend
you as an individual person, solo?
A. (By the translator) I think they wanted to know who had the
money.
Q. It's "yes" or "no."
A. (By the translator) Both things, to offend and to find the money.
If they check it's because they think they have the money.
Q. The question is to offend—a plan to offend everyone or to
offend only you.
A. (By the translator) I don't know they were looking for money,
and they check everybody, and that is what offends.98
The deposition testimony of the Plaintiffs is not contested.

As a matter of

uncontested fact, the Plaintiffs admitted that Esquivel's conduct was motivated by a
sincere desire to protect the employees from theft by their fellow employees; and, to
recover stolen property for one of the employees.

There was no testimony before

the court which created an issue of fact as to whether Esquivel acted with an intent
to harm or injure the Plaintiffs a n d / o r that his conduct offended against the
"standards of decency and morality."

Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, pg. 51, lines 22-25 and pg 52, lines 1-10
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There

was no

admissible testimony

or evidence

before

the

court

to

demonstrate that Esquivel's conduct proximately caused severe emotional distress
to one or more of the Plaintiffs.

When the Plaintiffs were deposed, no Plaintiff

claimed to have suffered severe emotional distress.
medical attention as a result of the incident.

Not one Plaintiff

sought

As a practical matter, Plaintiffs'

deposition testimony described the incident as offensive, nothing more.
A party cannot create an issue of fact by contradicting its own prior sworn deposition
testimony.
A party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact by contradicting or
changing his own prior testimony. Camfield Tires, Inc., v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719
F.2d 1361 at 1365-1366 (8th Cir. 1983). In Van T. Tunkins & Associated, Inc. v. U.S.
Industries, Inc., 736 F.2d 656 (8th Cir.) the Court stated:
When a party has given clear answers to unambiguous questions
which negate the existence of any genuine issue of material fact, that
party cannot thereafter create such an issue with an affidavit that
merely contradicts, without explanation, previously given clear
testimony."
In Essick v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 965 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1992), the court
stated:
In Babrocky, we held that "a party should not be allowed to create
issues of credibility by contradicting his own earlier testimony. . . . In
so holding, we noted that if we allowed a party to create a genuine issue
of material fact by changing his own prior testimony: "the very purpose
of the summary judgment motion—to weed out unfounded claims,
special denials, and sham defenses—would be severely undercut." . . .
We also noted that the plaintiff had not explained the contradiction or
attempted to resolve the disparity. 100

99

100

Van T. Junkins & Associated, Inc. v. U.S. Industries, lnc.r 736-F.2d 656, at 657 (8th Cir.)
Essick v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 965 F.3d 334 at 335 (7th Cir. 1992)
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Stated another way, the Utah Supreme Court recognized the same long
standing rule, "that Plaintiffs

testimony

is no stronger

than its inconsistent

weakness." Ross v. Olsen, 481 P.2d 675, at 676 (Utah 1971).
The Defendants filed a Motion to Strike the Plaintiffs affidavits for the reason
that they contradicted Plaintiffs' prior sworn deposition testimony. 101 The Motion
was supported by a Memorandum. 1 0 2 The trial court did not rule upon the Motion
To Strike because, according to its ruling, Plaintiffs had failed to meet

other

preliminary requirements to establish a prima facie case. The trial court stated:
...The Court will first address the issue of summary judgment and, if
summary judgment is not appropriate, the Court will then address
defendant's Motion to Strike a n d / o r Disregard Portions of Plaintiffs'
Affidavits. 103
After the depositions of the Plaintiffs were completed, and after Defendants
filed their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiffs furnished affidavits in
which they substantially modified their earlier deposition testimony, in an attempt
to demonstrate that they suffered severe emotional injuries

as a result of the

incident. Examples of the contradictions created by the affidavits are as follows.
Mazariegos testified in her deposition that she was angry, but not severely
emotionally upset. She said she was mostly upset because soon after the incident
she was without a job and couldn't sleep for that reason. She stated:
Q. (By Mr. Martin) You came back to work the next day after the
checking?
A. (By the translator) I think so. I don't remember.
Q. Were you angry the next time you came to work?
Exhibit 16, Defendants' Motion to Strike a n d / o r to Disregard Portions of Plaintiffs' Affidavits, filed April 26,
1995, R 630-629
Exhibit 17, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike and/or to Disregard Portions of
Plaintiffs' Affidavits, filed April 26, 1995, R 628-618
Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25, 1995, R 696-685, at R 693, Para.
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A. (By the translator) Yes. I was upset. I was feeling bad for about a
month.
Q. Feeling bad with anger?
A. (By the translator) Yes.
Q. Angry enough to break things?
A. (By the translator) No. I never do that even if I am very angry.
Q. Angry enough to hurt someone?
A. (By the translator) No. I don't hurt anybody when I get angry.
Q. Angry enough to yell at children or family?
A. (By the translator) No.
Q. Angry enough to stay awake all night or -A. (By the translator) Yes. I stay several days without being able to
sleep, but not because of anger. I was — I couldn't sleep because I
didn't have work, a job.104
The affidavit prepared after the deposition substantially modifies the earlier
deposition testimony of Mazariegos and says:
When I got home I was devastated. I had a bloody discharge that
wasn't normal, but that was caused by my nerves and fear. I was
almost hysterical. I couldn't sleep all night long. But even so, I didn't
want to lose my job, and I returned to work, although I was very
nervous and angry.105
Mazariegos' Affidavit is countered by her sister's affidavit which indicates
that Mazariegos had a pattern of being nervous and upset long before the incident.
According to Esperanza Mazariegos' Affidavit:
But while she was working at the stamps place, she would
almost always arrive home angry and very nervous. She would also
almost always come home with a headache. I noticed that she was
extremely nervous, and I made her take linden tea to help her calm
down. I also gave her massages almost every night, and rubbed Vick's
vapor rub into her head so she would relax and calm down.106

Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, pgs. 48-49
See Exhibit 15, Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March
23, 1995, R 604-544, at The Affidavit of Rosa Mazariegos, R 559
See Exhibit 15, Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March
23, 1995, R 604-544, at Affidavit of Esperanza Mazareigos, R 551
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According

to another

sister of

Plaintiff

Mazariegos,

namely

Matilde

Mazariegos, the Plaintiff was always nervous and upset:
But when she worked at the stamps place she would almost always
arrive angry and very nervous.
She would come home w i t h
headaches, and it was difficult for her to finish the things she had to do.
She also began to act ebittered (sic) and sad. She would get angry w i t h
us, and many times she did not want to do her chores, nor eat.107
The three Mazariegos' Affidavits demonstrate that Mazariegos was always
upset and angry when she came home from work.

The three affidavits, taken

together, make it impossible for the Plaintiff Mazariegos to show that the incident in
question was the proximate cause of her being upset, angry, etc. on the day of the
incident, or for any period of time thereafter.
Semidey testified in his deposition that he wasn't damaged by the incident.
He said:
Q. Now, maybe this sounds silly.
It seems that from your
explanation here today that as a result of this action you suffered
no monetary loss. Is this true?
A. (By the translator) Yes, right.
Q. You were not damaged in any way except by feelings?
A. (By the translator) That's right.
Q. It also seems that you did not claim, other than your own fear,
that there was any forced detention of any person. Is this true?
A. (By the translator) For my own person? Only to my person?
Q. Is that an answer?
In other words — maybe we're not
communicating.
The sole reason for us being here is the feeling of offense as a
result of this conduct, meaning the search incident. Is this true?
A. (By the translator) Yes.
Q. You were offended by the checking, true?
A. (By the translator) Yes.108

107

See Exhibit 15, Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March
23, 1995, R 604-544 at the Affidavit of Matilde Mazariegos, R 550-549
Exhibit 20, Deposition of Walter Semidey, dated April 21,1994, pgs. 58-60
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In what appears to be a modification of his earlier deposition testimony,
Semidey's Affidavit says: "I was upset, nervous and angry,"109 and "I felt very upset,
very defensive, very aggressive. I continued this way for several days."110
Santiago testified in his deposition that he had very little concern over the
incident. He said:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Did anyone assault you?
No.
Did anyone cause you to fear for your safety?
No, no fear.
Did anyone cause you to believe that you would be harmed?
No, I don't fear.111
(By Mr. Martin) If we can talk a moment about your emotions.
Explain to me, if you can, the degree of your emotions which
resulted from the checking.
You mean when I was searched, when I was checked?
Yes.
Just simply a person feels uncomfortable.
Anyone could understand this.
Uh-huh.
did you become so concerned over a week that it caused you to
lose sleep?
The checking? No, I was fine with myself, with my own
conscience.112

In what appears to be a direct contradiction of his earlier deposition
testimony, Santiago's Affidavit says: "I felt humiliated and offended."113
Bardales testified in his deposition:
Q. I think every person can understand, at least in this country,
being very much offended by an extreme discourtesy, lack of
courtesy. Did this, as you described, exceptional lack of courtesy,

See Exhibit 15, Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March
23, 1995, R 604-544 , at the Affidavit of Walter Semidey, R 564
See Exhibit 15, Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March
23, 1995, R 604-544 , at the Affidavit of Walter Semidey, R 563
Exhibit 22, Deposition of Angel Santiago, dated April 20,1994, pg 40, lines 1-7
Exhibit 22, Deposition of Angel Santiago, dated April 20,1994, pg 45, lines 16-25 and pg 46,1-2
See Exhibit 15, Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March
23, 1995, R 604-544, at the Affidavit of Angel Santiago, R 556
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appear to you to be done with a purpose intending to inflict
injury, mental or physical?
A. (By the translator) I understand that not just the lack of courtesy,
but I consider it an attack to the person. Personally, I felt
emotionally very bad that whole day, an experience that n e v e r
happened to me. Worse, I never thought that in this country
that could happen to me. I've always tried to maintain m y
principles, and I've always been — and I've never had any
problem. This is the first time that I find myself in this
situation. 114
The Bardales' Affidavit prepared later greatly exaggerates the matter and adds
substantial claims and says:
This experience was one of the worst of my life. It left me very
nervous and depressed. I got angry at my wife without any reason. I
was very emotional and jittery for around a month after I left the
company. 115
The affidavits of the Plaintiffs contain statements which are inconsistent with
their previous deposition testimony.

Even without that obvious defect, the

affidavits of the Plaintiffs do no more than provide summaries of the state of m i n d
of the Plaintiffs on the date of the incident, i.e. that they were offended and angry.
But the affidavits do not demonstrate severe emotional distress proximately caused
by the incident.
As to the Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action, the Trial Court observed that
Plaintiffs did not have the necessary testimony or evidence to establish a prima facie
case of intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, proximately caused by the
incident in question.
18.
As to plaintiffs' fifth cause of action, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, the Model Utah Jury Instructions require the
elements of outrageous conduct by defendants and an intention to
cause emotional distress, or actions taken with reckless disregard of the
Exhibit 21, Deposition of Jose Humberto Bardales, dated April 21,1994, pgs. 44-45
See Exhibit 15, Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March
23, 1995, R 604-544, at the Affidavit of Jose Humberto Bardales, R 553
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probability of causing emotional distress. M.U.J.I. 22.1 (Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress). The Court does not find that
defendants' conduct constituted outrageous conduct. Neither does the
Court find any evidence that defendants intended to cause emotional
distress or that defendants acted with reckless disregard of the
probability of causing emotional distress. 116
As to the Plaintiffs' Sixth Cause of Action, the Trial Court observed:
19.
As to plaintiffs' sixth cause of action, reckless infliction of
emotional distress, the Model Utah Jury Instructions find no liability
for the negligent infliction of emotional distress absent a showing that
defendants should have realized their conduct involved
an
unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress or that, if emotional
distress were caused, illness or bodily harm might result. M.U.J.I. 22.5
(Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress - Part I). The Court finds n o
evidence that the search was conducted in a manner which would
involve an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress or that any
emotional distress might result in illness or bodily harm. Accordingly
the Court does not find any reason why defendants should h a v e
realized that such results might occur.117
Plaintiffs cite Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.. 565 P.2d 1173 (Wash. 1977)
as support for their claims. 118 However, Contreras is a case from Washington and is
not controlling Utah case law. The "tort of outrage" has not been recognized in
Utah, and Plaintiffs do not cite any Utah case law which recognizes the tort.
Plaintiffs' amended complaint does not include a cause of action for the tort of
"outrage." Contreras was a case involving aggravated circumstances and the cause
of action was for the "tort of outrage" because the Plaintiffs were subjected to:
continuous humiliation and embarrassment by reason of racial jokes,
slurs and comments made in his presence.
(Id. at 1174.)
In addition, in Contreras, the Court concluded that Contreras was subjected to
malicious and wrongful accusations of stealing property, and was subjected to public
116
117

Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25,1995, R 696-685, para. 18
Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25,1995, R 696-685, para. 19
Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, pg. 27
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scorn

and

ridicule

which

prevented

Contreras

from

obtaining

full-time

employment.
Plaintiffs cite Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985). Pentecost does
not support Plaintiffs' position in the case at hand.

In Pentecost the landlord

forcibly removed the tenants belongings from the property, by "self-help,"

and

refused to return them to the tenants. The court held the complaint stated a cause
of action:
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. One who intentionally
causes severe emotional distress to another through extreme and
outrageous conduct is liable . . ..119
Plaintiffs cite Matter Of Estate Of G r i m m , 784 P.2d 1238 (Utah App. 1989).
However, G r i m m holds against Plaintiffs position.

In G r i m m , the court quoted,

with approval, from the Restatement Of Torts and said:
It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the
defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and
outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so.
Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the
control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the
conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in
liability. 120
In G r i m m , the court continued to quote from the Restatement and said:
The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that
no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. The intensity and
the duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining
its severity. . . . It is for the court to determine whether, on the
evidence severe emotional distress can be found; it is for the jury to
determine whether, on the evidence, it has in fact existed. 121

Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, at 700 (Utah 1985)
Matter of the Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238, at 1246 (Utah App. 1989)
(Id. at 1246.)
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In the case at hand, the trial court indicated that Plaintiffs' testimony and
evidence had not met the m i n i m u m threshold required to put the matter to a jury
on the issue of severe emotional distress. In simple terms, Plaintiffs affidavits did
not demonstrate the severity of emotional distress required by the Restatement Of
Torts as quoted in G r i m m .
Plaintiffs' complaint, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action for Intentional and
Reckless Infliction of Emotional Distress must be dismissed.
POINT 5
PLAINTIFFS' SEVENTH, EIGHTH, AND NINTH
CAUSES OF ACTION MUST BE DISMISSED
In 77 C J.S. Right of Privacy and Publicity §10, the following is found:
The elements of the tort of invasion of privacy by means of
intrusion and seclusion have been variously defined. The tort has
been described as consisting of an invasion or interference by physical
intrusion or some other form of investigation or examination, into a
place where plaintiff has secluded himself, or into his private or secret
concerns, that would be highly offensive to an ordinary, reasonable
person. Other authorities have stated that the elements are intrusion,
which may consist of watching, spying, prying, besetting, overhearing,
or some other similar conduct, intrusion upon plaintiff which
concerns those aspects of himself, his home, his family, his personal
relationships, and his communications which one normally expects
will be free from exposure to defendant, substantial and unreasonable
intrusion, and an intentional act or course of conduct by defendant.
Still other authorities have simply stated the elements of the tort as the
existence of secret and private subject matter, the right in plaintiff to
keep that subject matter private, and the obtainment by defendant of
information about that subject matter through unreasonable means.
In Cox v. Hatch, 87 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 761 P.2d 556 (1988) the Utah Supreme
Court examined the Restatement of Torts (1977) regarding the torts of invasion of
privacy as follows:
Invasion of privacy as a common law tort has evolved over the
years into four separate torts. The Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977)
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defines four different types of invasion of privacy. Section 652A of the
Restatement states:
(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is
subject to liability for resulting harm to the interests of
another.
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion
of another, as stated in §652B; or
(b) appropriation of the other's name or
likeness, as stated in §652C; or
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's
private life, as stated in §652D; or
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other
in a false light before the public, as stated in
§652E.
(Id. at 6.)
In Cox v. Hatch, the Utah Supreme Court held that the publication of the
photograph of a person with Senator Hatch did not constitute an invasion of
privacy. The court stated:
In sum, we hold that pictures of public officials and candidates for
public office taken in public or semi-public places with persons w h o
either pose with them or who inadvertently appear in such pictures
may not be made the basis for an invasion of privacy or abuse of
personal identity action. . . .
(Id. at 6.)
Plaintiffs cite Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62 (Utah
App. 1992) In Turner, the Utah Court recited the elements of an invasion of privacy
as follows:
To establish an invasion of privacy claim of intrusion u p o n
seclusion, a complaining party must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence an intentional substantial intrusion, physically or otherwise,
upon the solitude or seclusion of the complaining party that would be
highly offensive to the reasonable person. . . ,122
In Turner, footnote 5, on page 67, suggests that as to claims of personal
intrusion, as opposed to claims of public disclosures, the appellate court would
(Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62, at 67 (Utah App. 1962)
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require an invasion of the complainant's private residence. It does not appear as
though T u r n e r would consider a search of an employee at his public place of
employment, to constitute an "intrusion into privacy" cause of action.
Plaintiffs' Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action.
In the case at hand, the Plaintiffs' complaint, Seventh and Eighth Causes of
Action are based upon claims that the Defendant Esquivel caused the Plaintiffs'
bodies and belongings to be searched, while they were at their place of employment.
Neither of the two causes of action fall within the only available category, i.e.
"unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another."
Plaintiffs were asked to go to the men's and women's rest rooms, respectively
and were searched. All the Plaintiffs describe the search as occurring in the rest
rooms. The testimony as contained in the depositions of the Plaintiffs demonstrate
that the only conduct complained of consisted of the search a n d / o r offer to search
the Plaintiffs while they were at their place of employment.

There are no claims

and no evidence of any attempt by Defendants to invade the Plaintiffs' personal
residences, automobiles or anything which could be remotely considered to be a
place of Plaintiffs' "seclusion."
Even if Plaintiffs were to amend their complaint to state a cause of action, as
recognized in Utah, the deposition testimony would not support a claim that
Defendants' conduct is actionable.
The Trial Court observed:
20.
As to plaintiffs' seventh and eighth causes of action,
intrusion into physical privacy and intrusion into personal belongings,
the Court does not find that the search, conducted at plaintiffs' place of
employment, constituted an "unreasonable intrusion upon the
seclusion of another." Restatement (Second) of Torts §652A(2)(a)(1977).
Plaintiffs made no claims that defendants attempted to invade
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plaintiffs' homes, automobiles, or other areas which could be
considered places of seclusion for plaintiffs.123
Plaintiffs' Seventh and Eight Causes of Action must be dismissed.
Plaintiffs' Ninth Cause of Action.
Plaintiffs' Ninth Cause of Action is based upon a claim that the Defendant
Esquivel inquired into the religious affiliation of the Plaintiff Semidey and asked
whether Semidey had a "valid temple recommend." 124 Plaintiffs allege that such
conduct constituted an "unwarranted, unnecessary, and wrongful intrusion into
Plaintiffs Semidey's private affairs."125
Again, referring to Cox v. Hatch and the Restatement, such conduct does not
fall within the parameters of the common law tort of invasion of privacy recognized
in Utah and in the Restatement.
The Trial Court observed:
21.
As to plaintiffs' ninth cause of action, intrusion into
personal affairs, this Court does not find this to fall within the
parameters of the common law tort of invasion of privacy recognized
in Utah and in the Restatement of Torts.126
Since Plaintiffs' Ninth Cause of Action fails to state a claim for relief which is
recognized in either Utah common law or in the Restatement, the complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and it must be dismissed.
POINT NO. 6
PLAINTIFFS DID NOT HAVE ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE THAT THEY
HAD SUFFERED SEVERE EMOTIONAL INTURY
Rule 803(4), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides for the admission of certain
statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment, as follows:

123
124
125
126

Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25,1995, R 696-685, at R 687, para. 20
Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint filed June 13,1994, R107-99, at para 41
Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint filed June 13,1994, R 107-99, at para 42
Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25,1995, R 696-685, at R 687, para. 21
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Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and
describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or
sensations, or the inception of general character of the cause of external
source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment.
In order to qualify under Rule 803(4), the patient's statement must meet a two
pronged foundational test: (1) is declarant's motive in making the statements
consistent with a desire to promote treatment, and (2) is it reasonable for the
physician to rely on the information

in his diagnosis or treatment?

Such

foundational requirements are imposed to assure that the patient has a "strong
motivation to be truthful."

Roberts v. Hollocher. 664 F.2d 200, 204 (8th Cir. 1981),

cited in Industrial Power Contractors v. Industrial Commission Of Utah, 832 P.2d
477 (Utah App. 1992); and Hansen v. Heath. 852 P.2d 977 (Utah 1993).
Plaintiffs cite the earlier case of State v. Schreuder. 726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1986)
for the proposition that a psychological report prepared solely for purposes of
litigation may be admissible in evidence. 127

However, in Schreuder, the Court

recognized that the "trial court tightly controlled Dr. Moench's

testimony." 128

Furthermore, Schreuder stated:
A psychiatrist or a psychologist of course cannot be made a
conduit for testifying in court as to any and all out-of-court statements
made. As with admission of evidence of any kind, great discretion is
accorded the trial judge in the determination of admissibility. The trial
court must, as with any evidence, assess the inherent reliability of the
testimony, the relevance of the testimony, and undertake a balancing

In the case at hand, the letter from

the psychologist, Juan A. Mejia,

demonstrates he examined the plaintiffs two years after the incident, not for the
purposes of diagnosis and treatment, but for the purpose of providing testimony at
Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, pgs. 42-43
State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, at 1224 (Utah 1986)
(Id. at 1225.)
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trial. The letter is not in the form of an affidavit and it does not meet the minimum
requirements imposed by Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civ. Proc. for the purposes of
opposing a motion for summary judgment.
The affidavit of Dr. Linda J. G u m m o w demonstrates that she did not meet
with or examine any of the plaintiffs. The statements made in her affidavit are not
based upon her personal knowledge, but instead are based upon hearsay statements
provided to her. The trial court commented upon the lack of personal knowledge
demonstrated in the affidavit, in the trial court's Memorandum Decision. 130

The

affidavit of Gummow does not meet the m i n i m u m requirements imposed by Rule
56(e), Utah Rules of Civ. Proc. in that the affidavit is not based upon personal
knowledge.
As indicated earlier in this Brief, while Plaintiffs were angry or upset, they did
not suffer "distress inflicted . . . so severe that no reasonable man could be expected
to suffer it." 131

The trial court correctly ruled that Plaintiffs had not met the

minimum threshold requirement of demonstrating severe emotional distress so as
to be entitled to present evidence of damages on the matter to a jury.
The trial court was correct in ruling that the additional submittals

from

Plaintiffs consisting of the letter from Juan A. Mejia, and the affidavit of Dr. Linda J.
G u m m o w did not meet the minimum requirements imposed by Rule 56(e), Utah
Rules of Civ. Proc.

Stated in simple terms, Plaintiffs did not have admissible

testimony or evidence that Plaintiffs suffered severe emotional
proximate result of the incident.

Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25, 1995, R 696-685, at R 687, para. 23
Matter of Estate Of Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238,1246 (Utah App. 1989
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distress as a

POINT NO. 7
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO RAISE AN ISSUE OF A MATERIAL FACT
WHICH PRECLUDED THE COURT FROM GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY TUDGMENT
Rule 4-501(2)(b) Code of Judicial Administration provides in part as follows:
The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise
statement of material facts as to which the party contends a genuine
issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separately n u m b e r e d
sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record
upon which the opposing party relies, and if applicable, shall state the
numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's statement that are
disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and
properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless
specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement. [Emphasis
added.]
In the case at hand, Defendant's Memorandum

complied with Rule 4-

501(2)(a) and set forth six pages of facts supported by reference to admissible
testimony and evidence. 132

As indicated previously in this Brief,

Plaintiffs'

statement of facts did not respond to Defendants' recitation of facts as required by
Rule 4-501(2)(b),133 and Defendants' statement of facts must therefore be deemed
admitted for the purposes of the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
In Plaintiffs' Brief on appeal, Plaintiffs make a misrepresentation to the Court
and state: "Defendants did not submit any factual evidence of their own in support
of their second Motion for Summary Judgment." 134

Plaintiffs

assertions

that

Defendants did not support their Motion with admissible testimony and evidence
are without merit, and are directly contrary to the record in this case.

Exhibit 11, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment - Failure to State Cause of
Action, filed October 13, 1994, R 341-315
See page 11 of this Brief
Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, pg. 4
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Plaintiffs' Brief on appeal contains a Statement Of Facts,135 but the facts are not
supported by specific references to admissible testimony or evidence.

Instead,

Plaintiffs' Brief on appeal makes nothing more than a general reference to the
depositions of the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs' own amended complaint, and Plaintiffs
affidavits. 136

Without

a specific reference

to support the individual

factual

statements made by Plaintiffs, it is not possible to verify that the factual claims are
supported by admissible testimony or evidence.
The Plaintiffs have not established that there were any genuine issues of
material facts which precluded the trial court from granting a summary judgment to
Defendants.
POINT NO. 9
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WAS BASED. IN PART.
UPON THE PREMISE THAT PLAINTIFFS COULD NOT
ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE
In Plaintiffs' Brief, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court weighed the evidence
and ruled against Plaintiffs. 137

However, Plaintiffs' characterization of the trial

court's decision, is not accurate. Rather than weighing the evidence, the trial court
concluded that Plaintiffs had not presented admissible testimony or evidence to
establish certain required elements of proof, which Plaintiffs

are required to

establish in order to present a prima facie case. The trial court made n u m e r o u s
references to the Model Utah Jury Instructions for the purpose of demonstrating
that certain essential factual elements would have to be established, as to each cause
of action.

Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, pgs. 4-7
Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, pgs. 4-7
Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, pg. 9
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Since Plaintiffs' evidence did not demonstrate certain essential elements of
proof, the trial court concluded the plaintiffs were not entitled to present their case
to a jury.
CONCLUSION
THEREFORE, the Respondent requests that the decision of the trial court be
sustained.
DATED this

/ ^ d a y of ? ^ ^ r y , 1996.
LOREN D. MARTIN, P.C.

^

^

^

D. Martin
ney for Defendants/Respondents
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